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RECENT DECISIONS
M IENS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGHTS UNDER TREATIES AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.-The plaintiff sought an order directing the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles of the State of New York to revoke a chauffeur's license issued to an alien,
in accordance with Section 20 (12) Vehicle and Traffic Law. On appeal from an
order of the Special Term directing defendant Commissioner to revoke the license,
held, one justice dissenting, the statute was unconstitutional, being in conflict with
the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 1794,1 the later Treaty of 1815,2
and also with the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution. 3 Order reversed.
Magnani v. Hartnett, 257 App. Div. 487, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 107 (3d Dep't 1939).
It has been decided many times in the United States Supreme Court as well as
in other jurisdictions, that a state statute which conflicts with a treaty between the
United States and a foreign sovereignty must yield to the treaty4 as such a statute
is unconstitutional. The language of the statute here in question is unambiguous.
It stated that until June, 1939, chauffeurs' licenses were to be granted only to citi-
zens and those who declared an intention of becoming citizens. Citizens only are
eligible after 1939. The conflicting provision of the Jay Treaty3 is that "all settlers
and traders within the precinct or jurisdiction of the said posts shall continue to
enjoy unmolested all their property of every kind and shall be protected therein."
This court interprets this clause to guarantee to British citizens more than property
ownership. It insures to subjects of Great Britain the right to engage in commerce,
trade, business or labor on the same terms as our own citizens. The pertinent pro-
vision of the Treaty of 1815 is: "generally, the merchant and traders of each nation
respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their com-
merce." The court thus gives the word "commerce" an interpretation broad enough
to include a chauffeur's work. There have been many cases decided which would
sanction such a liberal construction of the term. 6 But the courts were in these cases
1. 8 STAT. 117 Art. 2.
2. 8 STAT. 228 Art. 1.
3. U. S. CONST. Amend. 14.
4. U. S. CoNsT. Art. 2, § 2, Art. 6. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796); Baldwin
v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678 (1887); Hamilton v. Erie R. R., 219 N. Y. 343, 114 N. E. 399
(1916), writ of error denied, 249 U. S. 369 (1919); Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 128
N. E. 185 (1920).
5. Popular name for the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 1794; 8 STAT.
117 Art. 2.
6. That which the law looks upon as commerce is not restricted to specific acts of sale
or exchange. It includes the intercourse, all the initiatory and intervening acts, instrumen-
talities and dealings that directly bring about the sale or exchange. Brennan v. City of
Titusville, 153 U. S. 289 (1894).
Commerce is traffic, but it is much more. It embraces transportation by land and
water and all means and appliances necessarily employed in carrying it on. Chicago &
N. W. R. Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560, 568 (U. S. 1873); Hannibal R. R. v. Husen, 95
U. S. 465, 470 (1877); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885). See
Pollock v. Cleveland Ship Building Co., 56 Ohio St. 655, 662, 47 N. E. 582, 584 (1897),
citing Sweatt v. Boston, H. E. R. R., 3 Cliff. 339 (D. Mass. 1871); North River Steam-
boat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713 (N. Y. 1825); Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Lawrence,
2 Hun 163 (N. Y. 1873).
The term commerce, in its broadest acceptation, includes not merely traffic, but the
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determining the meaning of the term "commerce" as used in the Federal Constitu.
tion. This is proper also in treaty interpretation. In the words of Mr. Justice Butler,
"Treaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two construc-
tions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the
other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred."7
However, the United States Supreme Court in Clarh v. Dechebach,8 did not quite
go so far as the constitutional cases when it was interpreting this very Treaty of
1815. The court held that the operation of a billiard academy is not "commerce"
within the terms of the treaty which "guarantees reciprocal 'liberty of commerce'"
between American and British nationals. Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the court,
said that "It would be an extravagant application of the language quoted to say
that it could be extended to include the owner of a place of amusement who does
not necessarily buy, sell, or exchange merchandise or otherwise participate in com-
merce." 9 In the instant case, the liberal interpretation of the term "commerce" was
apparently influenced by the application of the "most favored nation" doctrine.10
This court probably feels that once this doctrine is applied in favor of the English
citizen under his treaty, he gets rights equal to those of Japanese citizens under the
treaty between Japan and the United States, a much broader treaty which might
require issuing chauffeur's licenses to Japanese." The court in the course of the
opinion stated the word "commerce" should be given a liberal construction consistent
with the purposes and ends sought to be attained by the treaty. If we look to the
treaty, however, and to the purposes and ends sought to be attained' by it as ex-
means and vehicles by which it is prosecuted. See Winder v. Caldwell, 14 Hovw. 434, 444
(U. S. 1852).
7. See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 342 (1924).
S. 274 U. S. 396 (1927).
9. Id. at 395. The court went on to distinguish Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332
(1924) upon which the court in the instant case relied. The treaty secured to Japanese
citizens the right to enter, travel, reside and to carry on trade in the United States and
to do anything incident to or necessary for trade. This language plainly is broader than
that of the Treaty with Britain of 1315. It was held to embrace within its provi'$ons a
Japanese pawnbroker whose business necessarily involved lending money on the ecurity
of merchandise and the sale of merchandise when necessary to realize on the s.curity.
See Clark v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 396 (1927).
10. Under the "most favored nation" doctrine which prevails in our relations with
Great Britain, subjects of Great Britain are entitled to as free a Ecope in commercial
activity as the nationals of other countries under later treaties between the United States
and these countries. But see Lukich v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 176 Wash. 221,
29 P. (2d) 388 (1934), where it was said that the "most favored nation" clause of a
treaty with Serbia referring to commerce and navigation did not render inapplicable a
statute reducing non-resident aliens workmen's compensation to one-half the recovery
allowed citizens. The effect of the "most favored nation" rlause seems restricted to the
matters covered by the particular treaty in which the clause is found.
11. 27 STAT. 1504 (1911).
12. As stated in the title its purpose is "to regulate the commerce" between the two
countries. "Art. 1. There shall be between the territories of the United States of America
and all the territories of his Britannical Majesty in Europe a reciprocal liberty of commerce.
The inhabitants of the countries, respectively, -hall have liberty freely and securely to come
with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers in the territories aforesaid,
to which other foreigners are permitted to come, also to hire and occupy houses and ware-
1940]
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
pressed within it, it would be difficult to find the present interpretation of it sanc-
tioned. The actual purpose and end of the treaty seems to be to promote the
commerce between the countries and to eliminate therefor possible hardships on
merchants and shippers.
In the principal case the majority also held that the statute was a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides
that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law. 18 Whether
the statute is a violation of an alien's rights depends on whether it interferes with
his engaging in ordinary business and earning a living thereby. If the statute does
that, and it is an irrational discrimination, it is clearly unconstitutional.1 4 If, how-
ever, the alien is merely denied certain privileges, which the state in the exercise of
its proprietory power 15 or police power1 6 can withhold at its discretion, there is no
violation of his rights and the statute would be valid under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. That the use of the highway was merely a privilege was the contention of
the Special Term,' 7 as well as of the minority in the principal case. Both opinions
relied to a great extent upon the opinion in Gizzarelly v. Presbrey,18 where it was
held that the use of the public highway was a privilege that could be limited by
the police power of the state. 19 In deciding that the statute conflicts with the Four-
teenth Amendment, the court, citing People v. Crane,20 held that mere alienage Is
not a cause sufficient to prohibit the use of the highway by aliens. Justice Cardozo
in that case stated that there must be some relation between the exclusion of the
alien and the protection of the public welfare. It does seem difficult to comprehend
houses for the purposes of their commerce and generally, the merchants and traders of
each nation respectively, shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their
commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries respectively."
13. U. S. CONST. Amend. 14.
14. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1885); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (191$);
In re Tiburdo Parrott, 1 Fed. 481 (C. C. D. Cal. 1880); In re Ali Chong, 2 Fed. 733
(C. C. D. Cal. 1880); Fraser v. McConway and Tonkey Co., 82 Fed. 257 (C. C. D. Pa.
1897); Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 Fed. 1 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1900).
15. Crane v. People of the State of New York, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427 (1915)
writ of error denied, 239 U. S. 195 (1915) (right to exclude aliens from public works);
State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138 (1885) (taking oysters in the navigable waters of the state) ;
State v. Kagine, 33 R. I. 211, 80 Atl. 432 (1911) (catching lobsters within the jurisdiction
of the state).
16. Clark v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927) (from operating a billiard academy);
Tokaji v. State Board of Equalization, 67 P. (2d) 1082 (Cal. 1937); Tragnesser v. Gray,
73 Md. 250, 20 AtI. 905 (1890) (right to refuse license to alien to sell spiritous liquors);
Miller v. Niagara Falls, 207 App. Div. 798, 202 N. Y. Supp. 549 (4th Dep't 1924) (sale
of soft drinks).
17. 169 Misc. 697, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 447 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
18. 44 R. I. 333, 117 AtI. 359 (1922).
19. The court held that it was a distinct benefit to the public welfare that a careful
selection should be made of the individuals to whom authority is given to use the publlc
highways as carriers of pasengers for hire. Aliens as a class are less likely to be interested
in the state, its citizens and their safety, and to allow them to operate motorbuses would,
on the whole, tend to increase the danger to passengers and the general public using the
highway.
20. 214 N. Y. 154, 169, 108 N. E. 427, 432 (1915).
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how the business of driving for hire is particularly affected with the public interest.
The conclusion is inevitable that there must be more justification for the esistence
of such a statute alongside the Fourteenth Amendment. 21
CAuRmRS-LurBiiiTY PoR GRATunrous PASSENGER'S DnATr -An administrator
sued to recover damages for the death of his intestate allegedly caused by the de-
fendant's negligence. The intestate had been a driver employed by the Southeastern
Greyhound Lines, a common carrier, and at the time of his death was riding on a
pass procured for him by his employer from the defendant, the Atlantic Greyhound
Lines, another common carrier. The defendant and the intestate's employer were
separate bus companies. His interstate journey was performed solely in the interest
of his own company. Before entering the bus, he was required to sign certain stipu-
lations on the back of the pass exempting the defendant carrier from all liability
for damages as a common carrier, whether caused by the negligence of the carrier
or its servants. The trial judge refused to admit this agreement as a defense and
the case went to the jury on the theory that the decedent was a passenger for hire.
On writ of error from a verdict found for the plaintiff, held, three judges dissenting,
the decedent's transportation was purely gratuitous. Judgment reversed; new trial
ordered. Atlantic Greyhound Li?xs v. Skinner, 2 S. E. (2d) 441 (Va. 1939).'
It is generally held in this country, that, in the absence of stipulations to the
contrary, a common carrier owes the same duty of care to a gratuitous passenger
as it does toward a passenger for hire.2 However, the carrier has been permitted
to limit its liability for negligence by positive stipulation, through the medium of a
release such as that employed in the case at bar, to a gratuitous passenger.3 Such
stipulations, independent of statute, have been considered contrary to sound public
policy when a passenger for hire is involved.4 Thus a prerequisite to recovery where
21. The case would have been much clearer had it appeared to what use the license
was to be intended. If the license was to be used by a truck driver, he would more
reasonably be held in "commerce" than if used by a private chauffeur.
1. Both majority and minority opinions agree that the case must be decided under
Federal Law, as the plaintiff's intestate was traveling an interstate route at the time of
the accident. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Van Zant, 26 U. S. 459 (1923); William.zon
v. S. A. L. Ry., 136 Va. 626, 118 S. E. 255 (1923); Southern Ry. v. Wilmouth, 154 Va.
582, 153 S. E. 874 (1930).
2 Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397 (1839); Southern
Pac. R. R. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601 (1912); Abell v. Western Aid. R. R., 63 Md. 433
(1884); Quimby v. Boston & l. R. R., 150 Mass. 365, 23 N. E. 205 (1390); Buckley
v. Bangor & A. R. R., 113 Me. 164, 93 AI. 65 (1915). See CooLEz, ToTrs (3d d. 1905)
1479.
3. Northern R. R. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440 (1904); Boering v. Chesapeake Beach R. R.,
193 U. S. 442 (1904); Wells v. New York C. R. R., 24 N. Y. 181 (1862).
In some jurisdictions the rule is not followed, even as to gratuitous passengers. Jacobus
v. St. Paul R. R., 20 Minn. 125 (1873); Weisman v. Boston & Maine R. 11., 84 N. H.
475, 152 Atl. 476 (1930) ; Williams v. Oregon Short Line, IS Utah 210, 54 Pac. 991 (189S).
The rule is firmly established in Canada. Alexander v. Toronto & N. R. R., 33 U. C. R.
474 (1873).
4. Trunk R. R. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655 (1873); Walther v. Southern P. R. R., 159
19401
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a stipulation of the type mentioned presents itself, would be the establishment of
the passenger as one for hire.
The mere fact that a person accepts and uses a pass issued by the common carrier
does not of itself constitute him a gratuitous passenger. An attempt was made by
Mr. Justice Holmes to establish such a principle as the rule but later cases rejected
the notion.5 A grantee of a pass becomes entitled to the status of a passenger for
hire if there exists a mutuality of consideration in the transaction.0 So long as some
detriment is suffered by the recipient of the pass at the request of the carrier, the
gratuitousness of the transportation is removed. It is in the application of this
principle that the gulf appears between the majority and dissenting opinions of the
case at bar.
The majority opinion pointed to the lack of any agreement between the defendant
and the decedent's employer concerning the interchange of passes. Nor was there
any duty imposed upon the defendant to supply passes to the other carrier. The
case was devoid of evidence tending to establish that the defendant had contemplated
using the facilities of the other carrier in consideration of its issuing the pass for
the intestate's use. It was said to be a practice to exchange passes. But nothing
compulsory appears. Neither the intestate nor his employer paid any compensation
for the passage, the attitude of the defendant being one of disinterest as to whether
the trip was made or not. It was stated: "The alleged benefit to defendant is based
solely on the mere possibility that sometime in the future its corporate business
might necessitate the use of transportation by its employees over the lines of the
other carrier. Such a consideration or possible benefit is too vague, uncertain and
indefinite to constitute the plaintiff's intestate a passenger for hire." 7 In noting the
Cal. 769, 116 Pac. 51 (1911); Griswold v. New York & N. E. R. R., 53 Conn. 371, 4 At.
261 (1885); Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Ketcham, 133 Ind. 346, 33 N. E. 116
(1893); Doyle v. Fitchburg R. R., 166 Mass. 492, 44 N. E. 611 (1896). See (1936)
22 WAsH. L. Rv. 117.
5. The principles as exemplified in the cases in notes 2, 3 and 4, supra, were established
as early as New York Central R. R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1873). When the
Hepburn Act, 29 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (7) (1934), was adopted in June,
1906, it forbade the issuance of passes by common carriers with certain specified exceptions.
One exception, and that pertinent to the case at bar, was the interchange of passes for
the officers, agents and employees of common carriers, including the families of each.
After the passage of the statute, Mr. Justice Holmes construed it in the case of Charleston
& Western Carolina Ry. v. Thompson, 234 U. S. 576, 577 (1914). He stated, by way
of dictum, that it was the intention of Congress that thenceforth those persons excepted
by the act were to be considered gratuitous passengers.
Later cases, starting with Norfolk Southern R. R. v. Chatman, 244 U. S. 276, 284 (1917),
rejected the dictum of Mr. Justice Holmes and continued to observe the principles of
the Lockwood case as unaffected by the Hepburn Act.
6. For reasons of public policy the consideration for drover's passes, issued to the
caretakers of livestock, is said to be embodied in the whole transaction. Norfolk Southern
R. R. v. Chatman, 244 U. S. 276 (1917).
The same principle has been extended in some cases to mail agents and postal clerks.
Seybolt v. New York R. R., 95 N. Y. 562 (1884); Carter v. Washington & 0. D. Ry.,
122 Va. 458, 95 S. E. 464 (1918). See 2 SHEPu AN & REDIFLD, LAWs OF NwLIoENCE
(6th ed. 1913) § 492.
7. Atlantic Greyhound Lines v. Skinner, 2 S. E. (2d) 441, 444 (Va. 1939).
[Vol. 9
RECENT DECISIONS
disinterest of the defendant, the lack of duty or agreement to supply passes and the
fact that no loss or detriment was suffered by either deceased or his employer, it is
difficult to see how the total of these facts could indicate anything other than a
gratuitous passage. The defendant asked nothing in return for the pass and nothing
was given. A mere courtesy was extended and received without the essential ele-
ments of a contract being present.
This case is distinguishable from those involving mutuality of interest on the part
of the granting carrier and grantee of the pass.8 In these cases there is usually a
request by the carrier that the trip be made and an issuance of a pass in considera-
tion of the passenger's making the journey. It may also be distinguished from cases
where the pass is given in consideration of services rendered by the recipient? In
the latter instance the pass is given as compensation or as an inducement. The case
at bar bears a greater similarity to those cases in which the passenger rode for his
own pleasure or benefit on a pass procured from the carrier for that purpose'o
The dissenting opinion proceeds on the theory that sufficient consideration was
extended to the defendant to constitute the intestate a passenger for hire. Strenuous
objection was registered by the minority against the attempt made by Mr. Justice
Holmes to constitute those persons excepted from the provisions of the Hepburn
Act, gratuitous passengers as a matter of law."1 His interpretation of the Act was
that Congress, in allowing only certain classes of persons to receive passes, chose
only those who in fact gave no consideration. He was, therefore, of the opinion
that any person allowed by the statute to receive a pass was by the same token to
be considered a gratuitous passenger. However, the dissent would not have been
adverse to setting up such a generalization to the opposite effect if it were not
prohibited by the same authorities which ignored the attempt of Mr. Justice Holmes.
In other words the dissenting opinion would welcome the formulation of a principle
whereby all persons not prohibited by the Hepburn Act from receiving passes would,
as a matter of law, be held to be passengers for hire.
There are three steps taken by the minority in constructing its argument. An
examination of certain picked cases, each refusing the plaintiff recovery, is first
S. Grand Trunk R. R. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655 (1878) (plaintiff was requested by the
defendant carrier to travel on its pass and inspect a patent coupling in another city);
Nickles v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 74 S. C. 102, 54 S. E. 255 (1906) (a man riding at
the request of the carrier to act as a witness for the carrier in consideration for which
both he and his wife received passes, recovered for the death of his rife caused by the
carrier's negligence).
9. Virginia Beach Bus Line v. Campbell, 73 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) (a voman
recovered when it was found that she received her pass in consideration for giving in-
formation to the public concerning the carrier's rates and schedules); Powell v. Union
Pac. R. R., 255 Mo. 420, 164 S. W. 62S (1914) (lawyer riding on a pass in conzideration
that he would not take cases against the railroad in a certain county and would aid the
railroad attorneys in local matters).
10. Bowman v. Penn R. R., 299 Pa. 558, 149 AU. 877 (1930), ert. derkd, 282 U. S.
849 (1930) (a general agent of one railroad riding on a pass over another line was held
to be a gratuitous passenger as no consideration appeared to have been given); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440 (1903) (a railroad attorney not employed by the de-
fendant carrier, but traveling on a pass apparently for his own peasure, was held to be
a gratuitous passenger). See also Ellis v. Davis, 4 F. (2d) 322 (C. C. A. Sth, 1925).
11. See note 5, su=ra.
1940]
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presented.12 It should be noted that in each of these cases the relations between
the issuing carriers and the grantees of the passes are very remote and there would
be little likelihood of any consideration passing to the carriers. The assertion that
the deceased was an employee of another carrier and traveling on his employer's
business may put him in a closer position to the defendant carrier than that in which
the other plaintiffs stood, but in the final analysis consideration and not proximity
is the test. It would not seem that the consideration could be established merely
because the deceased worked for another carrier, yet it is upon this basis that the
minority proceeds.
Secondly, it is stated that the defendant carrier was under no duty to issue a pass.
Such issuance was entirely voluntary. It is assumed that since a carrier may issue
a pass as it pleases, it presumably will not do so unless it has received the same
treatment in the past or has the understanding that it will become the beneficiary
of a similar act in the future. Even if the presumption were valid, the receiving of
the same treatment in the past could hardly be considered a legal consideration for
the pass given to the deceased. It is generally held that past consideration is no
consideration at all.' 3 Lastly, the circumstances under which the intestate used the
pass are considered. It was maintained that the intestate had no choice but to
accept the transportation which his master had obtained for him. To refuse would
have meant jeopardizing his job. The dissenting opinion therefore contended that
having been forced to accept the transportation offered to him and having signed
the release under compulsion, the intestate acted under "duress of circumstances."
Although such an inference as drawn from the facts of the case may well be a true
one, still the defendant was not a party to any such compulsion. The dissenting
opinion maintained that it would be a violation of justice if the decedent's repre-
sentative were refused judgment under these circumstances. But it would be a more
flagrant injustice if responsibility were imposed upon the carrier for an act not
committed by itself and over which it had no control.
After an examination of both opinions, the majority seems to have achieved a
more logical and convincing presentation. It certainly conforms more closely to
established authority. In previous decisions, the grantee of a pass who had signed
a stipulation relieving the carrier from negligence, only recovered when a very strong
consideration existed for the issuance of the pass. Contrasting the case at bar with
these cases immediately brings to light the real differences involved.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INCOME TAX-IMMUNITY OF STATE JUDnGs.-Plaintiff
refused to include his salary as a justice of the Supreme Court under gross income
in his income tax return for 1937 and pay a tax' based thereon under a law enacted
after he took office. Plaintiff claims the tax law is unconstitutional because the N. Y.
12. Baltimore & 0. S. W. Ry. v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498 (1900); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Adams, 192 U. S. 440 (1903). In Norfolk Southern R. R. v. Chatman, 224 U. S. 276
(1917) the mother of an employee of the carrier was refused judgment. See also Boering
v. Chesapeake Beach Ry., 193 U. S. 442 (1904). In the latter case the plaintiff was the
wife of a man who apparently had no carrier connection. How he obtained the pass Is
not dearly stated.
13. 1 WmrsToN, CoNTRAcTs (rev. ed. 1936) § 142.
1. N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 744, § 1 (subd. 4).
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CON-ST. Art. VI, § 19, prohibits the diminution of justice's salaries during 1heir
respective terms of office. The controversy was submitted on an agreed statement
of facts. Held, two justices dissenting, the statute is constitutional, the tax does
not diminish the salary of judges within the meaning of the constitutional prohibi-
tion. Black v. Graves, 257 App. Div. 176, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 785 (3rd Dep't 1939).
There have been no prior New York decisions on this question,2 though there
have been adjudications by federal and other state courts dealing with the problem
of taxing a judge's compensation.3 In 1920, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided the case of Evans v. Gore,4 which is basically like the instant case, since
the taxing statute in question was passed after the judge involved took office.r, The
majority of that court held that it was unconstitutional for Congress to tax a
federal judge's salary, advancing the reason that judges were immune from every
diminution of their Salary accomplished either directly or indirectly because of
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution which was intended to nafe-
guard the independence of the judiciary.0 The income tax, even though non-
2. Gresser v. O'Brien, 146 Misc. 9D9, 263 N. Y. Supp. 6S (Sup. Ct. 1933), aF'd %cihoutl
opi no , 263 N. Y. 622, 1S9 N. E. 727 (1934) held that the salary of a judge of the court
of Special Sessions of New York City might be reduced. It ruled that the constitutional
provision which prohibits diminishing the compensation of all judges, justice. and surro-
gates is applicable only to judicial officers of Superior Courts. Whenever the contitu-
tional intention is to cover all judicial officers, the term judicial officers is usl.
See Ops. ATr'v Gm., 33 St. Dep't. Rep. 2S7 (N. Y. 1925). The Attorney General ruled
that the salaries of judges are not taxable with an income tax, but the exemption extends
only to those judges included under the constitutional provision.
3. Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920); Miles v. Graham, 26S U. S. 501 (1925);
-New Orleans v. Lea, 14 La. Ann. 197 (1859) (A New Orleans income tax held unconti-
tutional when applied to a judge's salary because it was a diminution); Long v. Watts,
1S3 N. C. 99, 110 S. E. 765 (1922) (the income tax was a diminution); Commonwealth
ex rel. Hepburn v. Mann, 5 W. and S. 403 (Pa. 1843) (the tax was a diminution). Prior
to this, Commissioners of Northumberland County v. Chapman, 2 Rawvle 73 (Pa. 1329)
ruled that such a tax was not a diminution. Dupont v. Green, 195 At. 273 (D2l. 1937)
(State could tax the salary of the state's attorney general, even though a constitutional
provision forbade diminution of the salary of any public officer).
Martin v. Wafford, 269 Ky. 411, 107 S. W. (2d) 267 (1937) (tax vas not a diminution);
Poorman v. State Board of Equalization, 99 Mont. 543, 45 P. (2d) 307 (1935) (the tax
-as not a diminution); Taylor v. Gehner, 329 Mo. 511, 45 S. W. (2d) 59 (1931) (income
tax is not a diminution. The inherent power of the legislature to tax is only subject to
express limitations).
4. 253 U. S. 245 (1920).
5. The statute in question in the Evans case was 40 STAT. 1062 (1919). The Conzti-
tution of the United States, Art. M1, Section 1 provides: "that judges, both of the supreme
and inferior courts, shall hold their office during good behavior, and shall at stated times,
receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminizhed during their
continuance in office." The diminution clause in the New York Constitution is practically
the came. N. Y. CoNsT. Art. 6, § 19.
6. See Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 252 (1930) the court referred to Alexander
Hamilton's words: "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of the judge than a fixed provision for their support. In the general course2
of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."
1940]
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discriminatory, was a diminution of judges' salaries and as a matter of public policy
must be declared unconstitutional. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes stated
that a non-discriminatory tax was not a diminishing of a judge's salary within the
meaning of the constitution.7
Although in Miles v. Graham,8 it was held unconstitutional to tax the salary of
a judge appointed after the enactment of the statute, 9 in line with Evans v. Gore,
in O'Malley v. Woodrough,'0 recently decided, the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a statute" which taxed the income of judges who were appointed
after its enactment. Writing for the court, Justice Frankfurter stated,12 ". . . the
meaning which Evans v. Gore imputed to the history which explains Art. 3, Section 1,
was contrary to the way in which it was read by other English-speaking courts.
The decision met wide and steadily growing disfavor from legal scholarship and
professional opinion. .. " 3 This decision shows that the Supreme Court itself doesn't
consider the reasoning of the Evans case sound.
14
Many states have adopted a rule contrary to that set forth in the Evans case,
although some few follow it. 5 In the present case it was the opinion of the majority
that the tax was not on the salary of the judge as such, but rather on his right as
a resident of the state to receive an income; that a judge, like every other resident,
ought to bear his share of the expenses of government. This view seems entirely
logical when one considers that the tax is a general one, non-discriminatory, and
assessed against all those in a definite income class. However, the minority opinion
observes that the tax involved amounting to more than sixteen hundred dollars is
a diminution, and it fears for the independence of the judiciary. It relies on the
FEDERALisT, No. 79. Chief Justice Taney, in an extra judicial opinion, 157 U. S. 701 (1863),
wrote that an income tax when applied to a judge's salary was unconstitutional and void.
7. Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 265 (1920). Justice Holmes indicates that he thought
judges were not to be a privileged class, but should share the cost of the institutions upon
which their well-being depended. Justice Brandeis concurred in the dissent of Justice
Holmes. See 253 U. S. 245, 264 (1920).
8. 268 U. S. 501 (1925) (deals with the same statute declared unconstitutional In
Evans v. Gore).
9. After stating Evans v. Gore bad decided that such a tax was a diminution, when
applied to judges appointed before the statute, the court said, as regards judges appointed
after the statute was enacted: "What the court here is asked to do is to rewrite the
pertinent portion of the statute. . . .That would be for the court to do what congress
expressly decided not to do. Whether it would or would not have been willing to tax
the minority, if the majority were immune, nobody knows, perhaps not even the members
of Congress itself. . . ." See Lowndes, Taxing Income of the Federal Judiciary (1932)
19 VA. L. REV. 153, for a good discussion of the decision in Miles v. Graham.
10. 307 U. S. 277 (1939).
11. 48 STAr. 686 (1932) 26 U. S. C. A. § 22 (a) (1936).
12. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277, 281 (1939).
13. See Clark, Further Limitations upon Federal Income Taxation (1920) 30 YALE L. J.
75; Fellman, Diminution of Judicial Salaries (1938) 24 IowA L. Rv. 89, which gives a
very complete history of the question of diminution of judges' salaries by taxation, both
as regards the Federal Government and various states. See, (1920) 7 VA. L. Rav. 69;
(1929) 43 HARv. L. RaV. 318; (1920) 20 COL. L. Ray. 794.
14. Dissenting in the O'Malley case, Justice Butler said the decision of the majority
destroyed the decision in the Evans case. 307 U. S. 277, 297 (1939).
15. See note 3, s-Upra.
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authority of Evans v. Gore and Miles v. Gralam. The argument that the tax is in
effect a diminishing of the judge's salary is true yet it is no more of a diminution
than a cigarette tax, a sales tax, or a real property tax and does not seem to be a
diminution within the meaning of the constitution. That such a general income tax
makes inroads into the independence of the judiciary fails in itself to appeal to
reason. Why should a judge lose his independence because he pays the same tax
as every other resident?
The public policy of New York State has been clearly stated in the very statute
at issue,16 and is contrary to the Evans case. The majority of the court in the
present case, following the modem trend of authority, announce that the power to
tax being comprehensive, it admits of few exceptions and these are strictly limited.' 7
They should be allowed only when the claimed exemption is clearly demonstrated.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-ILLEGIT]2IATES-RIGHT To TAKE By REPREEz_.TA-
TION.-This is an appeal to the Appellate Division from a decree of the Surrogate's
Court revoking letters of administration issued to the illegitimate son of a deceased
sister of the intestate. Held, one justice dissenting, that the decree was valid. An
illegitimate child may not represent his mother to inherit from his mother's collateral
relatives. Matter of Cady, 257 App. Div. 129, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 750 (3d Dep't 1939).
Affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals, 281 N. Y. 112 (1939).
At common law, illegitimates were incapable of inheriting,l and were held to be
nullius filii.2 Being legally the sons of no one, they have no legitimate blood in
them, and legitimate blood is the basis of inheritance.3 "If there be no other claimant
than such illegitimate children, the land shall escheat to the Lord."' This was the
harsh rule adopted at common law. An overwhelming majority of the American
jurisdictions5 also sanctioned it, but it has gradually been modified by statute in
many jurisdictions. 6
16. "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state that salaries and compesation
of public officials and judges shall be subject to personal income taxation under the laws
of this state. Equality of burden is a corner stone of sound tax policy. Inequality results
where the burden of taxation is unequally distributed." N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 744, § 1.
17. See Pacific Coast Ltd. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480, 491 (1932).
1. 2 BL. Co=an. *248. "The maxim of the law is Qud ex dainnato coilit rascuntur,
inter liberos non. computantur'
2. Ibid.
3. The Roman Law differs from the common law rule only in that it, at an early date,
provided means of legitimization of bastards in the event of the marriage of their parents.
2 BL. Co-=. *248.
4. Ibid.
5. See Legis. (1936) 84 U. or PA. L. Rnv. 531-542 to the effect that though the statutes
restricting inheritance by bastards varied, Connecticut alone did not adopt the common
law rules. See also Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F. (2d) 464, 465, 467 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930);
Hardesty v. Mtchell, 302 Ill. 369, 372, 134 N. E. 745, 746 (1922); Blartin v. Claxton,
308 Mo. 314, 316, 274 S. W. 77, 78 (1925); Ex parte Wallace, 26 N. LT. 181, 189, 190 Pa.
1020, 1024 (1920); Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, 189 (1884).
6. The tendency of both European and American legislatures has been toward permit-
ting illegitimate children to inherit as though they were legitimate. In Norway alto the
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In New York, it was provided by statute that a mother, her heirs or representatives,
might inherit from her illegitimate natural intestate son in the event that he pre-
deceased her; 7 but the illegitimate child was denied all right of 'inheritance except
that in the event his mother should die leaving no lawful issue, such illegitimate
would inherit her real and personal property.8 The effect of these two acts was to
allow the mother to inherit from her child as though he had been born in wedlock,
and at the same time to limit the child's right of inheritance. If the purpose of
these statutes be to discourage immoral relations, an ironic result has been reached
for under these laws the illegitimate, who is a victim of circumstances and already
branded as unclean by society 9 is further penalized by the state; but on the other
hand his mother, who has been guilty of illicit relationships, may inherit as though
she had done no moral or legal wrong.
This condition has not been changed by the recent revision of the Decedent Estate
Law. The point made by the dissenting justice in the instant case, that the final
words of limitation contained in the statute were omitted in the revision 0 and hence
the law was changed, was not persuasive. The law does not change the rights of
the illegitimate because the statute still grants him only the right to take "her"
(the mother's) real and personal property, and nowhere does the statute specify
that a natural child can represent his mother."' The statute as originally enacted
complete metamorphosis of the common law rule has been attained. France is not so strongly
of this tendency, while England by the Legitimization Act of 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. V,
c. 60 § 9, has adopted a rule analogous to that in New York. See 84 U. or PA. L. REv.
531; Robbins & Deak, Familial Property Rights (1930) 30 CoL. L. REV. 321; Legis. (1916)
16 COL. L. Rv. 698.
7. N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW (1938) § 83(7) reads: "If the deceased was illegitimate and
leaves a mother, and no child, or descendant, and no surviving spouse, such mother shall
take the whole and shall be entitled to letters of administration in exclusion of all other
persons. If the deceased shall have a surviving spouse, the spouse shall take $5,000 and
one-half of the residue, and the mother shall take the balance. If the mother of such
deceased be dead, the relatives on the part of the mother shall take in the same manner
as if the deceased had been legitimate and be entitled to letters of administration In the
same order."
8. N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAw (1929) § 83(13) formerly read: "If a woman die, leaving
illegitimate children, or legitimate descendents of deceased illegitimate children and no
lawful issue, such children or descendants inherit her real and personal property as If
such children were legitimate. In any other case illegitimate children or relatives shall
not inherit." (Italics inserted.) In Matter of Lauer's Estate, 76 Misc. 117, 136 N. Y.
Supp. 325 (Surr. Ct. 1912) it was held that an illegitimate child of a deceased sister of
an intestate is not entitled to share in the estate.
9. The stigma which has been placed upon llegitimiates by society has given rise to
many statutes, the result of which is at best a partial metamorphosis of the common law.
2 BEALE, CoNrizcr OF LAW (1935) 967 § 246(2). ALA. CoDE Atr. (Mitchle 1928)
§§ 7371, 7372; CAL. PROB. CODE (Deering, 1933-1935) §§ 255, 256; IDAUo CODE ANN.
(1932) §§ 14-104, 14-105.
10. N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 83(7)(13) effective March 30, 1938. The statute read
exactly the same as before its revision (see notes 7, 8, supra) except that the sentence,
"In any other case illegitimate children or relative shall not inherit" was omitted.
11. The surrogate, in the only case decided since the statute has become effective,
(except for the instant case) stated that the new sections were to be liberally construed.
ie allowed the illegitimate children to be classed as "relatives on the part of the mother,"
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was in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed. The courts
have no powers to change the statute or to read into it provisions not epressly
stated, although harsh results will invariably flow from the conclusion reached under
this particular statute, Section 83(13) of the Decedent Estate Law.?2
That the former rules, modes, and canons of descent were abolished has no legal
effect in this case because these rules were statutes of inheritance rather than dis-
tribution,' 3 the repeal of which cannot change the laws of distribution 1 4 In the
case at bar a result in accordance with these principles is reached. The property
must go to a stranger or escheat to the state despite the fact that a blood relation-
ship exists.
The courts have no remedy to ameliorate the harshness of the modem law. It is
for the legislature to enact just and specific laws regarding the status of illegitimates
-- especially those not self-sufficient-in order to abolish the inequities such as are
revealed in the case at bar. At least since blood is the basis for the rules of dis-
tribution in the preponderance of all cases, there ought to be legislation to the effect
that when the illegitimate is the only blood relative and an infant not self-supporting,
such relative, though he be illegitimate, may inherit.la However, the decision is
sound under the present law.
INTEREsT-AccEPTANcE or PRmciPAL As W vnsR-Ihaumr- CoNTRACr rOR IN-
TER S.-Plaintiffs sold and delivered building materials to the defendant. An itemized
account was rendered in August, 1926, on a printed form stating: "Terms cash-
and as such entitled to a fund deposited for the benefit of unknown kin. In so deciding
the Surrogate was following the tenor of decisions rendered prior to the premt statute
and not stating any new or changed law. Matter of Karenius' Estate, 170 Misc. 652,
11 N. Y. S. (2d) 44 (Surr. Ct. 1939). To the came effect see discussion in Matter of Lutz's
Estate, 43 Misc. 230, 88 N. Y. Supp. 556 (Surr. Ct. 1904) ; Matter of Anonymous, 165 ,izc.
62, 300 N. Y. Supp. 292 (Surr. CL 1937). See Heller v. Teale, 216 Fed. 387 (E. D. N. Y.
1914) to the effect that those who would take by a relationship established on the part
of the mother, may inherit as though the illegitimates were legitimate.
12. In contrast to the New York rule, several foreign states have apparently reached
more equitable results. Jackson v. Hocke, 171 Ind. 371, 84 N. E. 330 (1903) (ille-
gitimate children shall inherit from their mother as if they were legitimate; and through
the mother, if dead, any property or estate which she would if living have taken by gift,
devise, or descent from any other person); Keech v. Enriquez, 28 Fla. 597, 10 So. 91
(1891); Chambers v. Chambers, 249 Ill. 126, 94 N. E. 103 (1911); Elder v. Bales, 127
Ill. 425, 21 N. E. 621 (1889).
13. N. Y. DEC. Esm. LAw (1929) § St. 'Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181 (1884); Bell v.
Terry & Tench Co., 177 App. Div. 123, 163 N. Y. Supp. 733 (1st Dep't 1917); Matter of
Lauer's Estate, 76 Misc. 117, 136 N. Y. Supp. 325 (Surr. CL 1912).
14. "He is entitled under Sec. 83(13) to the estate which his mother would have taken
had she been living." Dissent in Matter of Cady, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 750, 752 (3d Dep't
1939). Barron v. Zimmerman, 117 Md. 296, 83 At. 258 (1912). This Maryland case
cited in the dissenting opinion does not apply even though the Maryland statute is worded
similarly to that of New York, because in Maryland the word "child" has been inter-
preted to include illegitimate children, which is not the New York interpretation. 1 pm,
LAW or Wirms (2d ed. 1926) § 902.
iS. See Matter of Cady, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 750, 754 (3d Dep't 1939).
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Accounts overdue, subject to interest." Defendant made ten payments between
September, 1926, and March, 1936. In 1932 and 1935, plaintiffs sent defendants
statements showing the principal balance as reduced by intervening payments. No
further mention was made of the interest beyond the repetition on each statement
of the original declaration, to wit, "Terms cash-Accounts overdue, subject to in-
terest." In July, 1936, upon the defendant's request, the plaintiffs rendered a state-
ment in which, for the first time, a sum was included for interest figured from
August, 1926, on the partial payment plan. Defendant refused to pay any interest
except upon the principal balance still due in July, 1936. On plaintiff's appeal from
a decision by the Appellate Division in favor of the defendant, held, three judges
dissenting, there was an implied contract to pay interest from August, 1926. The
plaintiff's right to interest had never been waived or surrendered. Judgment reversed.
Davison v. Klaess, 280 N. Y. 252, 20 N. E. (2d) 744 (1939).
The most striking disagreement between the majority and the dissenting opinions
is whether, on the facts of this case, an implied surrender or waiver of interest
took place. The dissent seems to take the position that such waiver is possible
whether interest is due as a matter of contract or as damages,' and was had here
by the plaintiff's application of the defendant's payments to the principal as evi-
denced by the statements of 1932, and 1935.2 On the other hand, the majority
opinion insists that an implied waiver of interest by acceptance of the principal
is possible only where the interest is recoverable by way of damages.3
Their disagreement raises the interesting distinction between interest cx contracht
and interest ex lege, the penalty imposed by law for the detention of money. In
short, between interest agreed to be paid as interest and interest compelled to be
paid as damages. The distinction has been generally recognized. 4 Contractual interest
has a separate, vital existence of its own as soon as it comes into being, and a suit
is maintainable which has as its sole object the recovery of such interest.6 There
1. "The obligation to pay interest indisputably existed. It is unimportant whether
it is created solely by law or based also on consent and agreement. The defendant does
not deny the obligation. She maintains that she has satisfied it." Davison v. Klaess,
280 N. Y. 252, 256, 20 N. E. (2d) 744, 750 (1939).
2. "The parties agreed that the balances stated in the account were correct and had
been arrived at by application of all payments made on account, upon the principal debt
as stated therein." Ibid.
3. Id. at 262, 20 N. E. (2d) at 748. The defendants set up on this appeal a waiver
of interest or a modification of the contract. The claim of modification was not sub-
stantiated by the evidence. The court treats the problem of waiver although it was not
properly pleaded.
4. Alabama City G. & A. Ry. v. Gadsen, 185 Ala. 263, 64 So. 91 (1913); Bassick Gold
Mine Co. v. Beardsley, 49 Colo. 275, 112 Pac. 770 (1910); Grennon v. New Orleans Public
Service, 17 La. App. 700, 136 So. 309 (1931) ; Standard Grocery Co. v. Taylor, 175 N. C.
37, 94 S. E. 520 (1917); Crane v. Craig, 230 N. Y. 452, 130 N. E. (1921); Fake v. Eddy,
15 Wend. (N. Y. 1835). In Nelson v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Corp., 76 F. (2d) 17, 23
(C. C. A. 8th, 1935), the court said: "Clearly the right to recover, interest after the
principal has been received and accepted depends upon whether the interest is due by the
terms of a contract or as damages in action for the principal."
5. New York Trust Co. v. Detroit, T. & I. Ry., 251 Fed. 514 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918);
Bassick Gold Mine Co. v. Beardsley, 49 Colo. 275, 112 Pac. 770 (1911); Davis v. Hlar-
rington, 160 Mass. 278, 35 N. E. 771 (1894); Fake v. Eddy, 15 Wend. 76 (N. Y. 1835);
Crane v. Craig, 230 N. Y. 452, 130 N. E. 609 (1921).
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is no separate action available merely for interest as damages. 0 The point is made
precisely in Bronx Gas & Electric Co. v. New York, where the court said: "The
interest here was not payable by the terms of the contract; was recoverable only
as part of the damages; it had no existence whatever, independent of the principal,
to which it was a mere accessory or incident, and did not, of itself, furnish the
subject matter of a distinct and independent action."7 From these well established
principles, the rule has been drawn that where interest is due as damages, it is not
recoverable after payments of the principal have been made and accepted,8 and the
subsidiary rule that when payment of the principal has been made and accepted in
installments, the interest on that part of the debt extinguished is waived.0 The
holding of the majority opinion that the interest in the case at bar arose as a matter
of implied contract, in their opinion, made the case one which did not call for the
application of the doctrine of waiver by payment of the principal. 10
Whether this case was one of an implied contract to pay interest or not is an
interesting problem. There was no agreement by the parties for the payment of
interest prior to the presentment of the original statement. The majority opinion
held that from the silent acceptance of the bill rendered, the implied contract to
pay interest arose."' The dissent answers: "It is difficult to understand how an
agreement to pay interest can be implied from failure to object to an account
rendered which correctly stated the amount due and the incidental obligation imposed
by law in case of failure to pay the amount."1 - Their argument has superficial
impressiveness. Was the statement merely an indication that interest would run
as a matter of damages? If so, objection was futile. What objection could the
defendant have made when interest would run on the account in any event, as a
matter of damages, if not by contract, since the agreed terms were cash? However,
it is a familiar proposition that one is conclusively presumed to know the law and
thus the defendant must be taken to have assented to the contractual interest.
1l
But the portion of the bill here important read: "Terms cash-Accounts overdue,
subject to interest." It can most reasonably be stated that this sentence carried
not merely an implication that it was announcing the law of damages, but that it
was a statement of the seller's terms. There is no inconsistency in holding that
6. National Bank v. Mechanics Nat. Bank, 94 U. S. 437 (1877); Henry v. Henry,
103 Ala. 582, 15 So. 916 (1894); Conner v. Bank of Bakersfield, 183 Cal. 199, 190 Pac.
801 (1920); Crane v. Brooks, 189 Mass. 228, 75 N. E. 710 (1905); Cutter v. New York,
92 N. Y. 166 (1883).
7. 29 Misc. 402, 403, 60 N. Y. Supp. 548, 549 (Sup. Ct. 1899). The same principle is
recognized in England, "... . that here the principal having been paid, for it there could
be no verdict: that that being gone, everything founded on it must go too, therefore no
damages could be given in the present case, the claim for which alone was the foundation
of the present action." Dixon v. Parkes, 1 Esp. 110, 170 Eng. Reprints 296 (N. P. 1794).
8. Stewart v. Barnes, 153 U. S. 456 (1893) ; Crane v. Craig, 230 N. Y. 452, 130 N. E.
609 (1921); 1 Sur.RLA-.xn, DAmAGrs (4th ed. 1916) § 372, n. 89.
9. Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of New York, 29 Misc. 408, 60 N. Y. Supp. 543
(Sup. Ct. 1399); Balfour & Koch Co. v. Ranow, 127 isc. 21, 215 N. Y. Supp. 181
(Sup. Ct. 1926); (1927) 11 Mm-. L. REv. 378.
I0. See Davison v. Klaess, 280 N. Y. 252, 2613 20 N. E. (2d) 744, 748 (1939).
11. Id. at 258, 20 N. E. (2d) at 746.
12. Id. at 265, 20 N. E. (2d) at 750.
13. Braun v. S. F. Hess & Co., 187 I1. 283, 58 N. E. 371 (1900).
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the original account stated raised an implied contract to pay the interest.14
Whether the two statements relied upon by the defendant impliedly waive interest
is another problem. The dissent attempts to use the subsequent accounts of 1932
and 1935, rendered by the plaintiff as contracts in the form of accounts stated,
barring the recovery of the interest here demanded. This would seem to overreach
the usual theory of accounts stated as enunciated in Lockwood v. Thornc,15 and
followed by a long line of decisions.10 Since the accounts which the dissent relies upon
do not even purport to consider interest, it is difficult to see how the minds of
the parties can be said to have met and reached an agreement to waive it. These
accounts do appear to be accounts stated as to the principal balance which they
were obviously intended to cover, but this is not disputed. They do not touch
interest beyond indicating that past payments have been applied to the principal.
Since, at all events, the courts have frowned upon a waiver through such a process,17
the decision of the majority in the case at bar is apparently preferable.
There is also an equitable side to interest which the courts have recognized,18
and which the dissenting opinion invokes. The implication is made that the plaintiff
is estopped by his acceptance of payments and their subsequent application to the
principal balance. "It is too late to repudiate the choice and change the account
when the parties have acted upon it."1o But where has the defendant changed his
position to his detriment in reliance upon the plaintiff's action? He, the defendant,
had the use of the money during the period of his failure to pay the overdue debt.
Certainly, he is the one who would be estopped if he attempted to plead that he
would have been quicker to pay had he known that interest was running.
14. 1 WmmsLL oN, CoNTRArcs (rev. ed. 1936) § 94. The similarity between an account
stated and offer and acceptance is apparent.
15. 18 N. Y. 285 (1858). In setting out the rule of account stated, the court, at 288,
said: "In stating an account, two things are necessary: 1st. That there be a mutual
examination of the claims of each other by the parties; and 2nd. that there be a mutual
agreement between them, as to the correctness of the allowance and disallowance of the
respective claims, and of the balance, as it is struck upon the final adjustment of the
whole account and demands on both sides. The minds of the parties must meet upon
the allowance of each item or claim allowed, and upon the disallowance of each Item or
claim rejected. They must mutually concur in the final adjustment, and nothing short
of this in substance will fix and adjust their respective demands as an account stated.
.All this may be implied from circumstances."
16. See Stenton v. Jerome, 54 N. Y. 480, 484 (1873); Quincy v. White, 63 N. Y. 370,
377 (1875); Eames Vacuum Brake Co. v. Prosser, 157 N. Y. 289, 300 (1898); Watson
v. Gillespie, 205 App. Div. 613, 200 N. Y. Supp. 191, 199 (1st Dep't 1923); Brozan v.
Worms, 138 Misc. 404, 407, 246 N. Y. Supp. 1, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
17. See notes 8 and 9, supra.
18. O'Donnell v. Omaha R. Co., 32 Neb. 112, 48 N. W. 880 (1891); Van Rensselaer
v. Jewett, 2 N. Y. 135 (1849); Prager v. N. J. Fidelity & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 245 N. Y. 1,
156 N. E. 76 (1927).
"The whole tendency of courts of law and of courts of equity for a considerable period
of time, has been to break away from hard and fast rules and charge and allow interest
in accordance with the principles of equity, in order to accomplish justice in each partic-
ular case." John Agnew Co. v. Paterson Bd. of Education, 83 15. J. Eq. 49, 67, 89 Atl.
1046, 1054 (1914).
19. Davison v. Klaess, 280 N. Y. 252, 267, 20 N. E. (2d) 744, 751 (1939).
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LABOR LAw-INUNCTION-STOCRHOLERS' STATUS AS Eu1pLOYnS Iu LnoR Dis-
PurEs.--The plaintiff corporation sought an injunction pcidentc lite to restrain the
defendant union from picketing and from stating that a labor dispute existed between
the plaintiff and its employees. The stock of the plaintiff corporation is owned en-
tirely by a mother and her four sons. All the labor in the business is performed by
the four brothers. On appeal from an order of the Supreme Court granting the in-
junction, held, one judge dissenting, the corporate employer and its stockholders who
labor for wages in its business stand in the relation of employer and employee. There
is a labor dispute within the provisions of Section 876 (a) of the New York Civil
Practice Act. Judgment reversed; injunction dissolved. Boro Park Poultry Market
v. Heller, 280 N. Y. 481, 21 N. E. (2d) 687 (1939).
One of the divisions of the law that has been expanding in leaps and bounds in
recent years is Labor Law, and particularly that branch which has to do with peace-
ful and legal picketing 1 Owing to the great increase in the number of labor disputes,
and also to the fact that the courts were not quite sensitive enough to the pressure
of the labor movement, many states, following the example of the Federal Govern-
ment 2 passed anti-injunction legislation.3 In New York, the legislature passed Sec-
tion 876 (a) of the Civil Practice Act,4 which provides in part that "no court nor
any judge or judges thereof shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute, as hereinafter defined, except after a hearing, and except after findings
of all.. . facts ... " By subdivision 10 (c) of such section, the term labor dispute
is defined as including "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning employment relations, or any other controversy arising out of respective
interests of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in the relation of employer and employee."
The Court of Appeals of New York, when called upon to determine, in Thompson
v. Boekeout, whether or not a "labor dispute" existed within the meaning of this
section has said that where an "owner of a small business seeks to avoid 'labor
disputes' as defined in the statute, by running his business without any employees,
an attempt to induce or coerce him to hire an employee or employees, upon terms or
conditions satisfactory to persons associated in such attempted inducement or
coercion is not a 'labor dispute' within the letter or spirit of statutory definition."0
1. See Comment, Recent Trends in the Law of Picketing, supra, p. 95.
2. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 101 (Supp. 1938). "No
court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to izsue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor
giaU any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary
to the public policy declared in this chapter."
3. At least twenty-three states had adopted anti-injunction statutes up to 1935. For a
collection and classification of these statutes, see Riddlesbarger, State Anti-Ir.juion Leg-
islation (1935) 14 O. L. Rlv. 501; Comment (1937) 46 Y=rz L. J. 1064; (1938) 23
Cos-r. L. Q. 339.
4. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477.
S. 273 N. Y. 390, 393, 7 N. E. (2d) 674, 675 (1937). Plaintiff was engaged in the
business of operating a motion picture theatre, and had employed a licensed projectionzt,
a member of the defendant union. He himself had taken over the dutie of the projectionizt.
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On another occasion before the passage of § 876 (a) of the Civil Practice Act, the
Court of Appeals held in Luft v. Flove that a restaurant owner who ran his business
with only the aid of his wife and two children could not be picketed for refusing
to hire union help.0 In short unless an employer-employee relationship exists, there
can be no basis for a labor dispute within the meaning of the statute.7
In the instant case, the plaintiff corporation, owned entirely by a mother and her
four sons, was granted an injunction by the Supreme Court. That court felt that
the family was conducting a small business, and the four brothers were not to be
considered as employees, but rather as the corporation itself, and therefore were in
business without employees. The Appellate Division, and the Court of Appeals, how-
ever, reversed and stated that the corporation was the employer, and the four
brothers were employees, and therefore a relationship of employer and employee
existed. There was a basis for a labor dispute.
In comparing the instant case with Luft v. FloVe,8 (although that case was de-
cided before the enactment of Section 876 (a) of the Civil Practice Act it would
seem that it could be followed under the statute) we find the facts are strikingly
similar. In the Lult case, the plaintiff owned a delicatessen, and after one of his
employees went on strike, he employed only his wife and two children. The court,
in granting the injunction to prevent the union from picketing the plaintiff's estab-
lishment, stressed the fact that the plaintiff's wife and children could not be con-
sidered as employees, and therefore no employer-employee relationship existed. In
the instant case, the employees of the plaintiff corporation were a family group. It
had a contract with the defendant union, and had employed members of that union.
However at the expiration of the contract, finding that business was such that the
hiring of outside help would cause them to cease operating, the four brothers decided
to perform the services formerly performed by the members of the union. The
four brothers applied for membership in the defendant union, but were rejected on
the ground that they were not employees, but employers, which seems to be an extra-
judicial admission that an employer-employee relationship did not exist in that busi-
ness. Yet the Luft and Thompson cases, not yet cold in their resting place in the field
of precedent, are not considered applicable. The reason is that the brothers are
operating under the corporate form. The Appellate Division observes that the
plaintiff "must take the burdens with the benefits which result from doing business
under a corporate form." 9 The Court of Appeals does not restate the reason in so
many words, but points out that the legal entity of the corporation should not be
ignored in this case, and therefore the plaintiff must suffer for the privilege of
operating under a corporate name.' 0
6. 270 N. Y. 640, 1 N. E. (2d) 369 (1936).
7. American Gas Stations v. Doe, 250 App. Div. 227, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (2d Dep't
1937); Bieber v. Bininbaum, 168 Misc. 943, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 63 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Gips v.
Osman, 170 Misc. 53, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 63 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
The holding in these cases should not be confused with cases that hold that the labor
disputes need not be between the employer and employee. These latter cases are fully dis-
cussed in Comment (1939) 25 VA. L. R-v. 719.
8. 270 N. Y. 640, 1 N. E. (2d) 369 (1936).
9. See Boro Park Poultry Market v. Heller, 256 App. Div. 588, 591, 11 N. Y. S. (2d)
164, 167 (2d Dep't 1939).
10. The court further supports its holdings with two points. First, it claims that these
four brothers could receive the benefits of compensation for accidental injuries under the
Workmen's Compensation Law. Support for this assertion is found in Matter of Skouitchl
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The question of setting aside the legal entity of the corporation in order to measure
the rights of the true owners and operators of the corporation, has been a difficult and
delicate one for the courts.11 In early days of corporate law, the courts realized that
often they would have to look beyond the legal fiction of the corporate entity in
order to achieve justice.'- This is especially true today in cases where corporations
are hiding behind the legal entity to defraud creditors, evade statutes, achieve or
perpetrate a monopoly, evade existing obligations, and commit crimes.13 It will be
noted that in all these cases it is for the benefit and protection of the opponent of
the corporation that the courts will set aside the legal entity and look to the actual
members of the corporation. In the instant case, the plaintiff corporation voluntarily
adopted the corporate form, and now seeks to have it set aside for the benefit and
protection of the corporation. At first blush, this might seem an unreasonable re-
quest on the part of the corporation, and it might accomplish injustice if adopted as
a general rule. Yet when we look at the individual problem presented by the facts,
it seems clear that the plaintiff corporation is in reality these four brothers. The
refusal to disregard the legal entity of the corporation makes the result extremely
severe on them. The Special Term of the Supreme Court, exercising equity juris-
v. Chic Cloak & Suit Co., 230 N. Y. 296, 130 N. E. 299 (1921) (where a prident of a
small corporation, who was also a shareholder, was employed as general wanager, and the
court held he was covered by the compensation law). Second, it asserts that these four
brothers would be entitled to the preference granted "employees, operatives, and laborerd'
of insolvent corporations. The case cited to support this proposition, Palmer v. Van Sant-
voord, 153 N. Y. 612, 47 N. E. 915 (IS97) " holds that the word "employee" as used in the
statute does not pertain solely to those who perform manual labor. The quetion of
preference being granted to stockholders was not involved. We wonder bow far the courts
will go in granting preferences under the statute. It might be observed that under the
Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 874, 17 U. S. C. A. 104 (Supp. 1938) it has been held that the
policy of the law in granting the wage preference was to secure the wages of a class of
needy and dependent laborers, who have little means of knowing the credit of their em-
ployers. Thayer v. Mann, 2 Cush. 371 (Mass. 1845).
11. " . .-. the law relating to private business corporations could not be dearly under-
stood, unless the fact were recognized that such a corporation is really an association
formed by the agreement of the stockholders, and that'the existence of a corporation as
an entity, independently of its members is a fiction; and that, while the fiction of a cor-
porate entity has important uses and cannot be dispensed with, it is nevertheless cssntial
to bear in mind distinctly that the rights and duties of an incorporated a"-ociation are, in
reality, the rights and duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary
being." Mow8,rz, PavAxr CoRsonO*,rois (2d ed. 18S6) preface. See also Wo.m'r'm,
Dsrs-xsAR or Tm COaPORat FIcTMON & ALzim Conporn oN; Pno=ns (1927) 842.
12. In 1809 Chief Justice Marshall decided to look to the character of the individuals
who compose the corporation. He realized that unless he probed beyond the legal entity
of the corporation, the federal courts would not be able to exercise jurisdiction in many
proper cases because no controversy existed between citizens of different statL. Bank of
United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 92 (U. S. 1809).
13. Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F. (2d) 720 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Hamilton
Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928); In re Burntside
Lodge, 7 F. Supp. 785 (D. C. Minn. 1934); Mirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
103 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Paul v. University Motor Sales Co., 283 Mich. 587,
278 N. W. 714 (1938); Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 119 Ohio St. 439, 164 N.
W. 530 (1929).
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diction, clearly saw this, and in the interest of justice disregarded the legal entity
of the corporation and inquired into the rights of the real parties to the action. The
Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals, however, did not agree. Perhaps they
did not give sufficient weight to the fact that the primary purpose of equity is to
soften the severity of legalisms. In order to accomplish this purpose equity will many
times disregard technicalities. Or perhaps they did not think that any fact situation
warranted disregarding the corporate entity when the request was made by the
corporation. We do not believe that a corporation should be able to decide for itself
when it will or will not be an association of persons and not a seperate legal entity.
But we do believe that when the facts present a problem that cannot be solved equit-
ably without disregarding the legal entity of the corporation, it should make no
difference that the request to ignore the legal entity is made by the corporation for
its own benefits. We believe that the instant case presents such a problem. If we
look at this plaintiff corporation as a small association of persons, all members of
the same family, the rule of the Luft and Thompson cases should control.
PARENT AND CHILD-INFANT MOTHER'S SURRENDER OF CUSTODY.-Under Section
308 of the New York State Charities Law,' a fourteen year old mother signed a
written instrument of surrender whereby she relinquished her child to the Commis-
sioner of Public Welfare. The young mother, now sixteen and without means of
support, seeks to avoid the release on the ground that she was an infant at the time
of the execution. Held, since the statute makes no distinction between adult and
infant parents, the legislature must have intended that there be none; that infants
be permitted to make contracts like this, and therefore the infant mother is bound
by the instrument of surrender. Writ denied. Matter of Presler, 171 Misc. 559,
13 N. Y. S. (2d) 49 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
The question of the custody of children usually arises in cases involving disputes
between husband and wife; less frequently where the parents have given the child
into custody of a third person. At common law the primary right to the custody
of the child rested in the father exclusively.2 Under present statutory provision,
the right to custody is divided equally between both parents.3 But where a child
is illegitimate, as in this case, it has been the rule from early times that the right
belongs to the mother.4 The right to custody is not absolute, however, and may
be lost by either or both parents by misconduct,5 by abandonment or because of
1. N. Y. STATE Cmuuims LAw (1930) § 308 (5). This law which makes provision
for the care of destitute children was formerly Section 86 of the Domestic Relations Law.
2. 2 KENT, Comm. *205, note (b). This right was rigidly enforced even to the point
of taking a very young child away from its mother. See (1936) 5 Foan m L. REy. 460.
3. N. Y. Domr. REL. LAw (1923) § 81. For a collection of similar provisions In other
jurisdictions see 4 Viwr, AmxcAN FAimv LAws (1936) § 232.
4. 2 KENT, Co.m. *215. The putative father may have a superior right as against
a stranger.
Such provisions are also found in statutes, e.g. N. Y. Dow. REL. LAw (1938) § 111 (3)
requiring that consent to an adoption be given by the "mother of a child born out of
wedlock." Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802 (1907).
5. Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802 (1907).
6. Matter of Duffy, 202 N. Y. Supp. 323 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (where mother left child
with strangers and saw him only three times in five years); Moore v. Powers, 241 MIch.
567, 217 N. W. 780 (1928); Pope v. Brown, 3 N. J. Misc. Rep. 572, 128 Ati. 811 (1925).
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their unfitness to properly care for the child.7 Moreover, parents may voluntarily
relinquish this right by consenting to an adoption s or by a contract giving the
right of custody to a third party.9 Under the State Charities Law a voluntary re-
linquishment of custody is provided for by allowing the parents to place the child
in an institution upon the execution of a written instrument of surrender.10
A consideration of these means of voluntary surrender of custody would seem
to show that the latter two methods are closer to the nature of contracts than to
adoptions. An adoption is, in a sense, contractual in that it requires mutual agree-
ment of the parties having custody and those desiring it. But an adoption also
creates a status and needs the action of the court; and it is the status created and
not the contract between the parties which governs the rights of the child.' An
adoption cannot therefore be abrogated at the wish of the parties concerned;
although the parties are all agreed, they cannot change the status without going before
the proper court.1 2 Contracts of custody not requiring court approval are different.
Some courts have declared such contracts void as against public policy on the
ground that the right to custody is not a property right and cannot be treated as
such.' 3 Others have enforced such agreements where they are based on a promise
to leave property to the child. 14 Such a contract may be revocable at the instance
of the parent although in terms it may be equivalent to an adoption agreement.'6
An instrument of surrender under the State Charities Law is to be "under such
terms, and subject to such conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties thereto.!"'
7. Matter of Miller, 119 Misc. 633, 197 N. Y. Supp. 8S0 (Co. Ct. 1922) (adoption
granted without consent of mother where she was found unfit to care for the child).
s. N. Y. Domr. R . LAw (1938) § 111.
9. N. Y. Dos. Rra. LAw (1925) § 81; N. Y. Sum. Cr. Acr (1914) § 187. People
ex rel. Rich v. Lackey, 139 Misc. 42, 248 N. Y. Supp. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (child prodigy
given in custody to music teacher).
10. N. Y. SvTrn CnAmxs LAw (1923) § 303. The instrument may by its terms give
consent in advance to the adoption of the child. Under some circumstances the mere
signing of the instrument may constitute such an abandonment as to dispenwe with the
necessity for the parent's consent to adoption. Matter of Cohen, 155 Misc. 202, 279
N. Y. Supp. 427 (Surr. Ct. 1935). The circumstances exist where there is any conduct
on the part of the parent evincing a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child. See Winans v. Lupple, 47 N. J. Eq. 302, 305,
20 At. 969, 970 (1890); Matter of Davis, 142 Misc. 631, 690, 255 N. Y. Supp. 416, 426
(Surr. Ct. 1932).
11. N. Y. Dom. Rzn. Law (193S) § 112. Matter of Ziegler, 82 Misc. 346, 143 N. Y.
Supp. 562 (Surr. Ct. 1913).
12. N. Y. Dom. Rr. LAw (1933) § 116. Adoption is strictly statutory in origin and
operation and therefore the means prescribed in the law must be used.
13. Stickles v. Reichardt, 203 Wis. 579, 234 N. W. 723 (1931). See (1931) 30 M=nr.
L. Rv. 155.
14. Middleworth v. Ordway, 191 N. Y. 404, 84 N. E. 291 (19083); Van Tine v. Van
Tine, 15 At. 249 (N. J. Eq. 188S); Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah 4S0, 33 Pac. 213 (1393).
15. Matter of Donnelly, 70 Misc. 584, 129 N. Y. Supp. 120 (Sup. Ct. 1911) (mother
released custody of child; no legal adoption followed. The mother was later able to sup-
port the child; the court decided that the relation of mother and child was paramount
to all other considerations, and the humane thing to do would be to give her back her
child).
16. N. Y. STATE CnsnlTIPs L w (1923) § 303 (5).
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In that respect such an instrument differs from an adoption agreement which is
absolute once approved and cannot be subject to any conditions imposed by the
parties. The language quoted would seem to indicate a type of contract and not
seem to contemplate a situation as formal and irrevocable as an adoption. If the
instrument of surrender may be so regarded, it may be argued that it is avoidable
by the infant parent. At the time the section involved became a part of the State
Charities Law, the precise question raised in the instant case was put to the attorney
general for his opinion.17 He viewed the instrument as a type of contract subject
to the general principles of contract law with regard to infants. It was there pointed
out that had the legislature intended to include infants within the scope of the law,
it should have so stated explicitly.' 8
But the court here asserts that this statute is of the class which confers an
authority, not previously exercisable by adult or child. The legislature, in confer-
ring such authority in general terms without differentiating between adult or child,
must have intended the statute to apply equally to all parents, regardless of age.
As an example of this type of law the court cites Section 52 of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law.19 But that law is a procedural statute in the field of tort liability.
There are usually no distinctions made in favor of infants, -0 as far as their tort
obligations are concerned. In the field of contracts there have been such distinctions.21
In its reference to Section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law relating to adoption
however, the argument of the court might seem more forcible. It is pointed out
that Section 111 of the Domestic Relations Law does not distinguish between adult
and infant parents, in requiring parents to consent to the adoption of their children.
The court then notes the sections of the State Charities Law which allow the com-
mitment of girls up to 16 years of age to the New York Training School for Girls 22
and which authorize the superintendent of that institution to place the children of
17. Ops. ATT'y. GEN. (N. Y. 1923) 348. The court in the instant case notes this opinion
but states that it cannot agree with it. Of course it is not binding on the court.
18. "Courts, however, presume that a radical change in the common law by statute,
. . . will be expressed with the clearness which the importance of the subject demands
or so that its meaning is unmistakable." Id. at 350. See also Seligman v. Friedlander,
199 N. Y. 373, 376, 92 N. E. 1047, 1049 (1910).
19. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRArgic LAW (1939) § 52. This section has to do with the
service of non-residents by means of service on the Secretary of State. Gesell v. Wells,
229 App. Div. 11, 240 N. Y. Supp. 628 (3d Dep't 1930), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 604, 173 N. E.
885 (1930) (the Court of Appeals decided that the consent given by a minor to another
to use the minor's car was not a contract which could be disaffirmed by the infant de-
fendant so as to avoid liability in tort).
20. HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 282. Exceptions in favor of infants usually have to do
with considerations of contributory negligence. An infant of 8 years of age, for example,
is not judged by the standard of due care applicable to adults; but is chargeable with
such care as may reasonably be expected of one of his years. Marius v. Motor Delivery
Co., 146 App. Div. 608, 131 N. Y. Supp. (1st Dep't 1911). See Bohlen, Liability in Torts
of Infants and Insane Persons (1924) 23 Mica. L. REV. 9.
21. See Broderick v. Aaron, 240 App. Div. 537, 271 N. Y. Supp. 86 (1st Dep't 1934),
aff'd, 266 N. Y. 506, 195 N. E. 175 (1935) (where an infant was held exempt from assess-
ment for the statutory liability of stockholders). However, see N. Y. BANXlo LAW (1933)
§§ 80, 120, where liability of assessment is imposed against all stockholders, failing to
differentiate between adult and infant stockholder. See (1936) 5 FoRmDws~ L. R.v, 379.
22. N. Y. STATE CHARiTis LAW (1933) § 186.
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inmates in adoption "with the consent of the mother."23 Such mother would of
course be an infant. But it does not seem a necessary conclusion that the consent
so given would be irrevocable, because the court may always take into consideration
the circumstances under which a consent is given.2 4
The property rights of infants are jealously guarded by the disability of infancy
to a point that sometimes seems absurd.2- The theory of the rule has been that
one who has not attained a certain age is incapable of the shrewdness needed, or
lacks the experience to protect his interests against the adults with whom he con-
tracts. But the holding in this case would seem to imply that the legislature believes
that by becoming a parent one is endowed with a complete sense of the consequences
of his act regarding his child. The very same person, however, requires the pro-
tection of the law when he decides that he has made a bad bargain with regard to
some property. If these rules are unsatisfactory, it lies with the legislature to reform
them all. If the theory is still valid, then the legislature has made a misstep in
permitting an infant to make a contract of custody.
There is a ground upon which the court could have reached the same decision
and with which there can be no quarrel. In all cases where the custody of a child
is in issue, the chief consideration in the eyes of the law is the welfare of the child?1
Thus the court may not give a child into the custody of a parent who is actually
unfit to care for it, in hopes that the parent may thereby be rehabilitated. 7 Although
a court may not interfere with the right of an unoffending parent merely to better
the temporal position of a child,28 the court may, in its discretion, refuse to allow
the custody to natural parents.2 In the instant case it appears that the young mother
has no adequate means of supporting her child and that, because she is so young and
has been delinquent, the welfare of her child might be endangered. On the basis of
the rule just stated, the result reached in this case is sound.
TAXATION-CONSTrrUTIONALITY oF RETRoACTIvE INCoL=E TA, L sILATIO.i---The
plaintiffs, residents of New York, received an income in the form of royalties from
the operation of ore lands situated in Minnesota and for the years 1930 and 1931
they paid a New York State income tax thereon. In 1933 a refund was demanded
23. N. Y. STATS CHAR s LAW (1933) § 190.
24. See note IS, supra. When Section 51 of the Domestic Relations Law removed the
disability of coverture, it did not thereby affect the disability of infancy. Thus there was
a recognition of the distinction between the rights and disabilities arising separately from
each status. In the absence of statutory provision to that effect, it does not sem that the
status of parenthood should affect the rights and disabilities of infancy.
25. Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Secuties Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 18S N. E. 726 (1934)
(false representation as to age did not prevent the rescission of the contract). See (1935)
4 Foan ,s. L. REv. 132.
26. "The welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court
is to be guided." State ex rel. Palmer v. Postlethwaite, 106 W. Va. 383, 384, 145 S. E.
738, 739 (1928).
27. In re Lee, 165 Cal. 279, 131 Pac. 749 (1913).
28. Ex parte Livingston, 151 App. Div. 1, 135 N. Y. Supp. 328 (2d Dep't 1912).
29. Matter of Bock, 280 N. Y. 349, 21 N. E. (2d) 186 (1939) (paternal uncle appointed
guardian of the person of the child although no moral turpitude shown on the part of
the mother).
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and subsequent taxes for that year were paid under protest. Since 1933, Minnesota
income taxes were also paid. The New York income taxes for the years in question
were assessed under Section 359 of the New York Tax Law. An amendment of
1935 provided that the section should be retroactive to January 1, 1919, the date
of the enactment of the original statute.' On appeal from a judgment confirming
the assessment by the Tax Commission, held, three judges dissenting, that the
amendment making the statute retroactive for a period of sixteen years was so
unreasonable and arbitrary as to render the amendment invalid. Judgment reversed.
People ex rel. Beck v. Graves, 280 N. Y. 405, 21 N. E. (2d) 371 (1939).
The Constitution of the United States nowhere expressly prohibits the enactment
by states of retroactive laws.2 Insofar as such laws do not impair the obligation of
contracts, 3 divest property rights and vested rights without due process of law,4
partake of the character of ex post facto laws,5 or do not violate state constitutions,0
there is no invalidity attached to their enactment. 7 The constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws will not apply to a tax statute inasmuch as that provision
has been interpreted as applying solely to criminal statutes.
8
1. N. Y. TAx LAW § 359 (N. Y. Laws 1919, c. 627, § 1, amended N. Y. Laws 1935,
C. 933, § 1). The term "gross income": "1. Includes gains, profits and income derived
from salaries ...or dealings in property, whether real or personal, and whether situated
within or without the state, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such
property; also from interest, rent (including rent derived from real property situated old-
side the state), dividends ... or gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever . . ., it being intended to include all of the foregoing items, without regard to
source thereof, location of the property involved, or any other factor, except only a case
where the inclusion thereof would be violative of constitutional restrictions. Sec. 2. Thij
Act shall be retroactive to Jan. 1, 1919." (Amendment of 1935 italicized.)
2. "Upon principle every statute, which . . . impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new dis-
ability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past must be deemed retro-
spective." Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 Fed. Cas. 756, 767
(C. C. D. N. H. 1814). The terms "retroactive" and "retrospective" as commonly used
are synonymous. Los Angeles v. Oliver, 102 Cal. App. 299, 283 Pac. 298 (1929).
3. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 10 forbids the states from enacting any law impairing the
obligation of contracts but there is no such prohibition against the Federal Government.
See Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 700, 718 (1878).
4. U. S. CoNsT., Amendments 14 and 5 respectively bind the State and Federal Govern-
ments to an equal degree. See Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 700, 718
(1878). But even retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts or
partake of the character of ex post facto legislation are not condemned by the contract
clause even though they may divest vested rights. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 539 (U. S. 1837).
5. U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 10 and see note 3, infra.
6. Among states whose constitutions include a prohibition against retroactive legis-
lation are: Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Texas. 2 COOLEY, CONSTItUTiOnAL LrmTAxIONS (8th ed. 1927) 773.
7. See Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 21 (1931) where it was said that "a tax
is not necessarily and certainly arbitrary and therefore invalid because retroactively applied."
8. The prohibition against ex post facto laws was not inserted "to secure the citizen in
his private rights, of either property or contracts. . . .Every ex post facto law must
necessarily be retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law; the
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It is an exceedingly difficult task to glean any fundamental principle from the
decided cases dealing with the validity of retroactive tax legislation in general. For
although it has been held that a gift tax cannot be retroactively applied to an inter
vivos gift made a few days before the enactment of the law,9 yet in the field of
income tax legislation the courts have allowed a greater degree of latitude in deter-
mining the permissible period of retroactivity. Such leniency is largely attributable
to the courts' recognition of the legislative difficulties involved in assessing and
apportioning the costs of government in the light of the present need for revenue.
Retroactive taxation is by no means a new concept. Virtually all Federal Income
Tax Acts have been characterized by a limited degree of retroactivity insofar as
they applied to income earned during the calendar year10 prior to the passage of
the act. One general theory behind retroactive tax legislation permits such statutes
to operate retroactively, but not to the extent of allowing consequences to attach
to the act of a taxpayer by way of becoming subject to taxes which he could not
have reasonably foreseen and, if he so chose, avoided. 1 However well this theory
of the avoidance of the taxable event may be argued in the field of estate and gift
taxes, such an argument cannot be adduced in opposition to a tax imposed on income.
For where the donor might have chosen to give or not to give when the possibility
of a tax upon the gift could be foreseen, in no practical view of life can the receipt
of income be termed a voluntary act of the taxpayer. While not physically impossible,
it is practically inconceivable that a taxpayer would refuse to receive income even
if he knew that its receipt would later be subjected to a new tax, depriving him
of a part of that income.
Undoubtedly any new tax which provided for a sixteen year period of retroactivity
should be declared unconstitutional as an arbitrary deprivation of property without
due process of law.Y3 Such legislative action would be deemed indefensible by any
former only are prohibited." Chase, J. in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 391 (U. S.
1798).
9. Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440 (1928). Here the court refused to uphold
the validity of the tax, although it appeared that the gift was made while the bill was in
last stage of progress through Congress.
10. Stockdale v. The Insurance Companies, 20 Wall. 323 (U. S. 1873); Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. 1 (1916);
Lynch v. Harnby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918). In not one of the above cases was the statute
declared unconstitutional on the grounds of its retroactivity. For a brief hiatory of retro-
active taxation, see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Untermeyer v. Ander-
son, 276 U. S. 440, 446 (1928).
11. See Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 542 (1927); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S.
142, 147 (1927); Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 445 (1928); Welch v. Henry,
305 U. S. 134, 147 (1938). See Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation (1935) 43 Hxv.
L. REv. 592.
12. 'The objection of retroactivity in an income tax "is addresed only to the particular
inconvenience of the taxpayer in being called upon, after the customary levy and payment
of the tax has passed, to bear a governmental burden of which it is said he had no warning
and did not anticipate' Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 148 (1938). Here the court upheld
a Wisconsin emergency income tax statute which was retroactive for a period of two years.
However, it must be noted that the Wisconsin legislature only meets every two years and
the law was only retroactive to the last session at which tax legislation could have been
considered.
13. Judge Lehman in his dissenting opinion willingly conceded this point. People ex rel.
Beck v. Graves, 280 N. Y. 405. 411, 21 N. E. (2d) 371, 373 (1939).
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conscientious individual, whether judge or layman. It is only because of the present
statute's complicated and peculiar history that such an amendment could be con-
ceived by the legislative mind. Section 359 of the Tax Law, defining taxable income,
was originally enacted in 1919.14 At that time the tax was levied upon "income
derived from . . . dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of
the ownership or use of or interest in such property." Thus no express distinction
was made between income derived from property within or without the state. This
problem was not clarified until 1933 when People ex rel. Pierson v. Lynch'5 decided
that income received by residents of New York from the rental of real property
located in another state was not taxable under the statute as it then read. The
amendment of 1935 involved in the instant case corrected this defect and expressly
provided for the taxation of income so held to have been exempt.' 0 One year later
the right to tax income from real property in another state was upheld as consti-
tutional in People ex rel. Cohn v. Graves,'7 but the effect of the statute's retro-
activity was not decided, as the question was not properly brought before the court
for decision at that time.
Thus it would appear that the crux of the problem is to be found in the inter-
pretation given to the decision in the Pierson case. In the instant decision the
majority of the court held that that case settled the law in New York to the effect
that the income in question was free from taxation prior to 1935. Consequently
no amendment in the guise of a clarifying statute could reverse that decision by
subjecting to taxation retroactively a class of property formerly held to be exempt
while the original statute was in force.' 8
The dissenting judges differed in their interpretation of the Pierson case because
of the circumstances under which that case was decided. Their contention was
that because the United States Supreme Court had not given the last word on the
constitutionality of a tax on income received from property in a foreign jurisdiction
at that time, the New York Court of Appeals was forced to give a narrow con-
struction to the statute by excluding a tax which was of doubtful validity.'0 But
as that doubt has since been removed,20 there can be no claim that a new assessment
is being made by the amendment. For the amendment itself has merely given to
the statute retroactively that construction which almost everyone placed on the
14. N. Y. Laws 1919, c. 627, § 1. See note 1, supra.
15. 263 N. Y. 533, 189 N. E. 684 (1933), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 52 (1934).
16. See note 1, supra.
17. People ex rtl. Cohn v. Graves, 271 N. Y. 353, 3 N. E. (2d) 503 (1936), aff'd, 300
U. S. 308 (1938).
18. The legislature cannot impose retroactive taxation on a class of property as of a
time when it was not subject to taxation. First National Bank v. Covington, 103 Fed.
523 (C. C. D. Ky. 1900).
19. At the time of the Pierson case it was thought that a tax on income derived from
property could not be distinguished from a tax on property itself. Consequently if the
properly was taxed, any subsequent taxation on income therefrom would constitute double
taxation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U. S. 429, 580, 581 (1895). See Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States (1935) 48 Hmv.
L. R.v. 407.
20. "The theory which once won a qualified approval, that a tax on income is legally
or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable." Graves v. New York ex rei.
O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 480 (1939), citing New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308,
313, 314 (1938).
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statute prior to the decision in the Pierson case-that is, that the tax, as originally
assessed, was a tax on all income irrespective of its source.
If the dissenting opinion's interpretation of the Pierson case is acceptable, the
validity of the amendment may be upheld on technical grounds. It is unquestionably
true that when a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one of which
would render it unconstitutional, and the other valid, the court should adopt that
construction which saves its constitutionality. 21 But here the argument of the
dissent in upholding the validity of this statute is so highly technical as to become
repugnant to basic notions of common sense and fair play. It is far too much to
expect the ordinary individual to retain the profits from a transaction which has
been completely executed for the past sixteen years in order to pay the taxes
thereon. It is submitted that the majority opinion is well founded upon principles
of justice in declaring an amendment of such a highly retroactive nature to be
"unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and palpably unjust."2
TRUSTs--CoNvwRsION OF WASTING AssEs.-Deceased gave his residuary estate
in trust, the net income thereof to be paid to his widow for life. Secondary life
interests were given to his children. The principal assets of the residuary estate
were contracts which deceased had with insurance companies. Under these the
estate would receive commissions over a period of years on premiums paid the
companies on policies of insurance negotiated by deceased as the companies' agent.
In a proceeding to construe the will, the question involved was whether the re-
newal commissions on the insurance policies constituted principal or income or both
in the residuary trust.' Held, the contracts which gave rise to the right to payments
of renewal commission were not a wasting asset and the renewal commissions were
principal. Matter of Pennock, 172 Misc. 10, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 131 (Surr. CL 1939).
In reaching its conclusion, the court had to pass on the question whether th es
contracts were "wasting assets". 2 Although this topic has been discussed by the
courts of this state since 1832,3 this is the first decision in this jurisdiction holding that
21. See Knights Templars' & Masons' Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 205
(1902); Matthews v. Matthews, 240 N. Y. 28, 34, 147 N. E. 237, 239 (1925).
22. See People ex rel. Beck v. Graves, 280 N. Y. 405, 410, 21 N. E. (2d) 371, 373 (1939).
1. It appeared that the maximum commissions that could be collected would total
over $160,000. The contracts had been valued at $S7,135.32 for estate tax purpaes. The
aggregate amount of the commissions would far exceed the figure fixed for tax computa-
tion and it was the nature of this excess sum that was in dispute. Matter of Pennock,
14 N. Y. S. (2d) 131, 134 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
2. RSTAT amS , TRUSTS (1935) § 239, comment a, says: "Wasting property consists of
such interests as terminate or necessarily depreciate in course of time either bcause of
the nature of the interest or because of the character of the subject matter of the interest."
As examples of this type of property, it states: "Wasting property includes leaseholds and
other property yielding receipts only for a specified period of time: royalties; patent rights;
interests in things the substance of which is consumed, such as mines, oil and gas wells,
quarries and timber lands; interests in things which are consumed in the using, such as
food products; interests in things which are worn out by use, such as machinery and farm
implements." For similar definitions and examples see 2 ScoTr, Tausm (1939) § 241.4;
4 BoGERT, TRusTs (1935) § 828 (b).
3. Covenhoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige 122 (N. Y. 1830). There is no specific mention of the
term "wasting asset" but the court discussed goods of this nature.
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a contract giving rise to renewal commissions is not a wasting asset.4 Further, it ap-
pears that only one other jurisdiction has considered this particular question.0
The problem of wasting assets usually arises where the income of property has been
bequeathed to one for life with remainder over to another. When a residuary estate
is left in a trust of this nature, since it is the duty of the trustee to pay the income
to the life beneficiary and to preserve the corpus of the trust for the remainderman,O
a determination of an asset as being principal, income, or both is of interest to all
parties concerned. Of course what is principal and what is income is primarily a
question of the settlor's intention as manifested by the terms of the trust instru-
ment.7 It is when the testator has failed to manifest clearly his intention that diffi-
culty arises. A determination that an asset is a wasting asset is important because
of the treatment accorded such an asset. The celebrated English case of Howo v.
Earl of Dartmouth8 formulated the doctrine of "conversion of wasting or non pro-
ductive assets". This doctrine provides that the wasting, perishable, or consumable
asset must be sold and the proceeds invested in permanent securities, the life tenant
being given the interest on the investment and the corpus going to the remainder-
man on the termination of the life estate.9 This treatment of "wasting assets" has
4. Strictly speaking, this is not the first decision on this matter since Matter of Straus,
N. Y. L. J., July 8, 1938, p. 67, col. 4, decided by the same surrogate, held that "the
contract rights of the deceased in connection with the so-called renewal accounts constitute
capital of his estate and that all the proceeds therefrom must be treated as capital." The
opinion is utterly devoid of any reasoning at all on this point, it being merely stated as
a conclusion, and as such should not be treated as a precedent. The instant case quoted
from it but did not rely on it in the least. 0
5. Industrial Trust Co. v. Parks, 57 R. I. 363, 190 Atl. 32 (1937) in which the highest
court of Rhode Island held that contracts exactly similar to those now under consideration
constituted a wasting asset, thus reaching a different conclusion than did the instant case.
For tax purposes, it has been held that renewal commissions such as these are income.
Edwards v. Keith, 231 Fed. 110 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916), cert. denied, 243 U. S. 638 (.1916);
Woods v. Lewellyn, 252 Fed. 106 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918). See also Bull v. United States, 295
U. S. 247 (1935). These cases can not govern the instant case as the result here depends
on the presumed intention of the testator, while what is income and what is corpus for the
purposes of income and estate taxation is governed by different considerations.
6. 2 PERRY, TRusTs (7th ed. 1929) § 550.
7. In re Sherman Trust, 190 Iowa 1385, 179 N. W. 109 (1920); McLouth v. Hunt, 154
N. Y. 179, 48 N. E. 548 (1897).
8. 7 Ves. Jr. 137, 32 Eng. Reprints 56 (Ch. 1802).
9. The rule is stated in Spear v, Tinkham, 2 Barb. 211 (N. Y. 1847), to the effect that
when there is a bequest of the whole of the testator's personal estate, or of the residue
thereof to one person for life with remainder over, the whole must be converted Into
money and invested in permanent securities with the income of such investment being
paid over to the person entitled to the life estate. See also Ackerman v. Vreeland, 14 N.
J. Eq. 23 (1861) where the court said that if the chattels are bequested generally as dis-
tinguished from specifically, they must be converted into money, the income of which is
to be enjoyed by the tenant for life and the principal reserved for the remainder. If the
property cannot be sold immediately without great loss, the tenant for life is only entitled
to the interest on the value of the property. Hehme v. Strater, 52 N. J. Eq. 591, 30 Atl,
333 (1894). See also Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52 R. I. 277, 160 AtI.
465 (1932); Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ill. 437, 27 N. E. 65 (1891). The renewal
commissions in the instant case could have been apportioned by either selling the contract
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repeatedly been approved.' 0 The reason for treating wasting assets in such a way is
that the testator is presumed to intend that those entitled to the principal should
enjoy it without excessive diminution by reason of the income being enjoyed by the
life beneficiary. To carry out this presumed intention, the assets will be converted.1
However, since the rule is one of interpretation, it fails to apply when the deceased
has indicated a different intention.' 2 Such a contrary intention of the testator that
the life tenant is to receive all the proceeds of the wasting asset may be inferred
from the language of the will or from surrounding circumstances. 13 But mere names
as "corpus", "principal", "income", and the like will not defeat an intent disclosed
by the trust deed.14
It made a monetary difference in the instant case, whether the asset was held to
be a wasting asset or principal. If held to be principal, as the court did hold the life
beneficiary would only receive the interest on each renewal commission as it was
invested. This would be materially less than the income that would result from an
investment of the sale of the contract rights. Therefore, the life beneficiary would
receive far greater present value if the asset were determined to be a wasting asset
than if the asset was said to constitute principal.
In determining whether the contracts in the instant case were wasting assets it
may be best to consider why a particular asset is said to be of a wasting nature.
rights immediately and then investing the proceeds in trust investment securities, the
income to go to the life tenant and the principal to the remainderman, or as stated in
the Rhode Island decision, if a good price could not be obtained immediately, to appartion
the commissions collected in the same fashion as if the contract rights had been sold
immediately on the testators death and that sum had been invested by the trustees. See
also Cairns v. Chaubert, 9 Paige 160 (N. Y. 1841).
10. Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass. 583 (1S71) ; In re Hall's Estate, 130 Misc. 313, 224
N. Y. Supp. 376 (Surr. Ct. 1927); Livingston v. Murray, 63 N. Y. 4S5 (1877). Maryland
does not apply the rule. If the property is consumable in its use, whether the bequeft
is specific or general, the life tenant takes it absolutely. Seabrook v. Grimes, 107 Md. 410,
68 AtL 883 (1908).
11. Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass. 583 (1871); Union County Trust Co. v. Gray,
110 N. J. Eq. 270, 159 AUt. 625 (1932).
12. Frankel v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 152 App. Div. 58, 136 N. Y. Supp. 703
(Ist Dep't 1912), aff'd wt Iout opinion, 209 N. Y. 553, 103 N. E. 1124 (1913); Matter of
Hilliard, 164 Misc. 677, 299 N. Y. Supp. 788 (Surr. Ct. 1937); Matter of Hopkins, 171 Misc.
910, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 71 (Surr. Ct. 1939). Morgan v. Morgan, 14 Beav. 72, 51 Eng. Reprints,
214 (Rolls Ct. 1831), to the effect that later cases have allowed even slight indications
of intention of the testators part to prevent the application of the rule formulated in
Ho-we v. Dartmouth. The deceased in the instant case expressly directed that stock divi-
dends were to be dealt with as capital, from which it might be argued he intended the
renewal commissions should receive like treatment. The court, however, definitely stated
that it did not rest its decision on that ground.
13. Gay v. Focke, 291 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273,
174 N. E. 493 (1931); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 M:ais 158, 158 N. E. 530
(1927); Matter of Hall, 127 Misc. 238, 216 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Surr. Ct. 1926). The same
distinction is recognized in England in Alcock v. Sloper, 2 Myl. & K. 699, 39 Eng. Reprints
1111 (Ch. 1833). See also Matter of Tlliard, 164 Misc. 677, 299 N. Y. Supp. 788 (Surr.
Ct. 1937).
14. In re Sherman Trust, 190 Iowa 1385, 179 N. W. 109 (1920).
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Leaseholds are frequently given as an example of such an asset.15 Property of this
kind is likely to waste away or be consumed by tlie life tenant outliving the term
of the lease with the result that nothing of it would be left for the remainderman.10
Annuities are considered as being wasting assets because such a species of property
decreases in value as it draws nearer to its termination.' 7 In the examples given, the
property either necessarily depreciated in course of time, was actually consumed in
its entirety, or was eventually terminated.' 8 A similar situation is contained in the
15. The question of leaseholds today is so well settled and recognized that the courts
refuse to discuss the subject and almost automatically decide that the leasehold is a wasting
asset. Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass. 583 (1871); Frankel v. Farmer's Loan & Trust
Co., 152 App. Div. 58, 136 N. Y. Supp. 703 (1st Dep't 1912), afl'd without op4nion, 209
N. Y. 553, 103 N. E. 1124 (1913); Matter of Hall, 130 Misc. 313, 224 N. Y. Supp. 376
(Surr. Ct. 1927); Matter of Murphy, 138 Misc. 655, 246 N. Y. Supp. 714 (Surr. Ct. 1930);
RESTATE3MNT, TRusts (1935) § 239, comment a; 2 Scorr, TRusTs (1939) § 241.4; 4 Boo0nr,
TRusTS (1935) § 828 (b).
16. See Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass. 583, 585 (1871).
17. See Kinmonth v. Brigham, 5 Allen 270, 279 (Mass. 1862). Although there are no
New York cases in point, the court in the instant case, cited annuities as an example
of a wasting asset and evidently considered it so well settled in principle as to deem a
citation of authorities superfluous. See also SuRR. CT. AcT (1920) § 204.
18. See note 2, supra. Mines are usually cited as examples of wasting assets because
of their consumable nature. Yet courts often find an intent that the life tenant is to have
the full rents or royalties from the coal lands [Eley's Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 300 (1883)], or
accord them special treatment. A policy entirely distinct from the question of wasting
assets has developed about them. A review of the cases indicates that if at the time of
the commencement of the life estate the mines have not been opened, the life tenant Is
only entitled to the interest on the royalties from the mines and the remainderman receives
the corpus of the royalties. Blakely v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564 (1896); Mere-
dith v. Meredith, 193 Ky. 192, 235 S. W: 757 (1921). If the mines are opened before
the commencement of the life estate [Poole v. Union Trust Co., 191 Mich. 162, 157 N. W.
430 (1916); Woodburn's Estate, 138 Pa. 606, 21 Atl. 16 (1891)] or opened thereafter
under a previous lease, or authorization to lease by the owner, [Bramer v. Bramer, 84 W. Va.
168, 99 S. E. 329 (1919)], the life tenant may enjoy the rents and royalties in specie.
But see RESTATEMNT, TRUsTS (1935) § 239, comment g, states that the mere fact that the
mines were opened prior to the creation of the trust does not necessarily indicate an inten-
tion of the testator that the receipts were to be treated as income; nor does the fact that the
mines were opened after the creation of the trust indicate an intention that the receipts
should be treated as principal. Pennsylvania in In re Knox's Estate, 328 Pa. 177, 195 AtI.
28 (1937) held that it was a rule of property in that state that the life tenant of mining
lands was entitled to the whole output of the mines opened before the death of the testator
and refused to enter upon a discussion of the merits or demerits of the principle enunciated
by the Restatement for that very reason. This attitude has been extended to limestone
quarries. Lynn's Appeal, 31 Pa. 44, 72 Am. Dec. 721 (1857); slate quarries, Saycrs v.
Hoskinson, 110 Pa. 473, 1 At. 308 (1885); and oil and gas wells, Woodburn's Estate, 138
Pa. 606, 21 AtI. 16 (1891). For a thorough discussion of the Pennsylvania attitude see
Brigham, Pennsylvania Rules Governing the Allocation of Receipts Derived by Trustees
from Wasting Property (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 471. For a view contrary to the
Pennsylvania attitude, and holding mining stock to be a wasting asset, see In re Well's
Estate, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174 (1913).
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case of book royalties. 19 A book gradually decreases in popularity with a resulting
decline in the royalties. In M3ratter of ElsIWr20 and in Industrial Trust Co. v. Park.s=
as was pointed out by the Rhode Island court, what passed to the trustees was a
right to the receipt of payments, the amount of which could not be definitely ascer-
tained but which would steadily diminish in value from the beginning of the period
to the end, thus exhibiting the most important characteristics of a wasting asset. A
leasehold interest and an annuity are definite both as to date of termination and
the amounts payable. Yet they are held to be wasting assets because they may be
exhausted in the period of life tenancy.
In the instant case, even under the best of conditions,2 the renewal commissions
of their own nature2 had to diminish in amount and eventually terminate because
the premiums on each policy would cease to ba paid as the death of each insured
occurred. Necessarily, each of the insured persons had to die. On the death of the
last insured, no more renewal commissions would be payable. At some future date,
therefore, the right to these payments would terminate. These renewal commissions
were not only susceptible of exhaustion during the life tenancy but also were indefinite
both as to length of payment and amount of payment, which should give added
weight to a holding that they constituted a wasting assetC- ' because while the usual
examples of wasting assets (leaseholds and annuities) only contain the characteristic
of exhaustion, these renewal commissions possessed the additional element of un-
certainty of payment.
-The court in the instant case argued that the renewal commissions were simply
instalment payments for work completely performed; that they amounted to no more
than payments for services actually completed at the date of death, and in so de-
ciding relied principally on two New York cases.2 But the same argument could
19. Matter of Elsner's Will, 210 App. Div. 575, 206 N. Y. Supp. 765 (4th Dep't 1924);
In re Sullivan, [1930] 1 Ch. 84; Pickering v. Evans, [1921] 2 Ch. 309. Contra: In" re
Foster's Estate, 324 Pa. 39, 46, 187 AUt. 399, 402 (1936) which stated royalty payments
received during the life estate are wholly income.
20. 210 App. Div. 575, 206 N. Y. Supp. 765 (4th Dep't 1924).
21. 57 R. L 363, 190 Atl. 32 (1937).
22. The best conditions possible, as pointed out by the court, would be: 1. That none
of the policies would be permitted by the insured persons to lapse. 2. That none of the
insured will die during the operative contract period.
23. The court in the instant case said there was no speculative or uncertain factor
present in the renewal commissions. But was there anything more speculative and uncertain
than the amount of commissions that would be collected as already pointed out?
24. In connection with the holding in the instant case it is interesting to note a descrip-
tion of a wasting asset given by the same surrogate in a decision handed down nine days
previous to the instant case in Matter of Hopkin's Estate, 171 Misc. 910, 14 N. Y. S. (2d)
71 (Surr. Ct. 1939) where he stated that a wasting asset is one which may be consumed
during the trust period.
25. Matter of Elsner, 210 App. Div. 575, 206 N. Y. Supp. 765 (4th Dep't 1924); Ruben-
stein v. Rubenstein, 221 App. Div. 612, 224 N. Y. Supp. 727 (3d Dep't 1927). The Etsner
case dealt with royalties. The Rubenstein case concerned the assignment of a lease at an
increased rental which was to be paid in annual instalments. The court, in the Rubenstein
case, held the annual payments constituted principal, pointing out that if the purchase
price of the lease were paid in one sum, it would be part of the principal of the estate.
It thought that it was unimportant that the purchase price was paid in instalments.
Id. at 615, 224 N. Y. Supp. 72, at 729. There is dicta to similar effect in the EIsner case
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be strongly advanced in the case of royalties,20 annuities,2 7 and leaseholds,28 and
yet, as the court admitted, all are considered as being wasting assets.29 The instant
case would thus seem to be contra to the numerous holdings of the New York courts
in analogous situations. Certainly it is not desirable to have opposite views applied
to assets of a similar nature but yet that is the practical result of the decision.
It seems unfair to classify these renewal commissions as income and give all pro-
tection to the life beneficiary. Yet we are not satisfied with the holding here, What
is desired is a happy medium-one giving some protection to both life beneficiary
and remainderman. Such a result could only be obtained in the instant case by
treating these commissions as a wasting asset. It is submitted, therefore, that since
the right to the renewal commissions would eventually terminate at an uncertain
date30 and since the commissions would gradually decrease in amount, the court
(210 App. Div. 575, at 577, 206 N. Y. Supp. 765, at 767). The Rhode Island court in
its decision in Industrial Trust Co. v. Parks, 57 R. I. 363, 377, 190 AtI. 32, 38 (1937),
quoted the above statement from the Rubenstein case and said: "This is the entire sub-
stance of the reasoning and the doctrine of conversion of wasting assets is not mentioned.
It may be that there was interest on the deferred payments. If so, the decision seems
to us correct, but not otherwise since the present value of the right of the testator's death
would have been less than the sum of the payments, and the case would have been sub-
stantially contra to the well settled laws of New York as to wasting assets and to the
Minot case, which seems to us to state and apply the correct doctrine for such eases."
In Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass. 583 (1871) the testator had sublet a lease, the case
being thus similar to the Rubenstein case. The court said the asset was of a wasting
nature and if the tenant for life lived a few years longer and the rents were considered
as income, there would be nothing left for the remainderman. Id. at 585.
26. In the case of royalties, as pointed out by the Elsner case, the author agrees to
accept the speculative rewards as compensation for his skill and labor. Once the author
finishes the book his work is completely performed and the royalties take the form of
payments for services actually completed.
27. Where an annuity is payable to the testator it amounts to no more than instalment
payments for a consideration completely performed. In Alexander v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 233 N. Y. 300, 135 N. E. 509 (1922) where an annuity was given to
testator's wife for life after his death, the consideration of the contract giving rise to the
annuity was extra services of the testator rendered in the past and to be rendered In the
future. When the testator died, his services would have been completely performed and
the annuity would amount to no more than instalment payments for such work actually
completed at the date of death. The argument of the court, therefore, would be equally
applicable to both royalties and annuities.
28. When a testator acquires a leasehold his rights immediately arise on the signing
of the contract. As far as he is concerned, he has then completely performed his part
and the rents take the form of instalment payments. All the rights established by the
leasehold would be in existence at the date of his death. The payments made under the
leasehold would therefore be payments for services actually rendered at the date of death.
29. Matter of Pennock, 172 Misc. 10, 18, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 131, 139, 140 (1939). See
also notes 2, 12, 16, supra.
30. There was of course an absolute maximum for the life of the policies but it was
uncertain and indefinite whether this maximum would be reached since the policies could
cease at any time previous to the maximum date by lapsing because of the death of the
insured persons.
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should have adopted the reasoning of the Rhode Island Court and held the renewal
commissions to have been wasting assets.3 1
31. It may be noted that two leading authorities have cited the Industrial Trust Co.
case, which involved renewal commissions similar to those in dispute, as an eLamp.e of a
wasting asset without adverse criticism. 2 ScoTT, Taus (1939) § 241 (4) n. 1;
4 BoGERT, TRusrs (Supp. 1938) § 823 (b).
